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HOW APPLYING INSTRUMENTAL STAKEHOLDER THEORY CAN
PROVIDE SUSTAINABLE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
THOMAS M. JONES
University of Washington
JEFFREY S. HARRISON
University of Richmond
WILL FELPS
University of New South Wales Business School
Instrumental stakeholder theory considers the performance consequences for firms of
highly ethical relationships with stakeholders, characterized by high levels of trust,
cooperation, and information sharing. While research suggests performance benefits,
an obvious question remains: If instrumental stakeholder theory–based stakeholder
treatment is so valuable, why isn’t it the dominant mode of relating to stakeholders?
We argue that the existing instrumental stakeholder theory literature has three
shortcomings that limit its ability to explain variance in performance. (1) Little theory
exists around how instrumental stakeholder theory–based stakeholder management
could provide sustainable competitive advantage. (2) The literature has largely
neglected the potential downsides (i.e., costs) associated with pursuing these sorts of
stakeholder relationships. (3) There is a paucity of theory on the contexts in which the
incremental benefits of instrumental stakeholder theory–based stakeholder relationships are most likely to exceed the costs. As our primary contribution, we develop
a theoretical path from a communal sharing relational ethics strategy—characterized
by an intention to rely on relational contracts, joint wealth creation, high levels of
mutual trust and cooperation, and communal sharing of property—to a close relationship capability, which we argue is valuable, rare, and difficult to imitate and,
thus, a potential source of sustainable competitive advantage. We also consider the
potential costs of achieving this capability and identify contexts in which the resulting
relationships are likely to have the greatest net value.

performance. As summarized by Jones, IST holds
that “firms that contract (through their managers)
with their stakeholders on the basis of mutual trust
and cooperation will have a competitive advantage over those that do not” (1995: 422).
Although IST is a powerful theory with strong
prescriptive and normative conclusions, the IST
literature has failed to answer a vital question: If
the performance effects of ethical relationships
with stakeholders are positive, according to
both theory and empirical studies (Choi & Wang,
2009; Harrison, Bosse, & Phillips, 2010; Henisz,
Dorobantu, & Nartey, 2014; Jones, 1995; Jones &
Wicks, 1999; Sisodia, Wolfe, & Sheth, 2007), why do
so many firms treat stakeholders selfishly at best
(Mintzberg, Simons, & Basu, 2002) and unethically
at worst (Clement, 2006; Greve, Palmer, & Pozner,
2010)? We provide some answers to this question
by addressing three shortcomings that limit the
ability of scholars to fully understand the

Stakeholder theory is an umbrella term for a
genre of theories that help scholars and managers
understand relationships between firms and their
stakeholders, as well as some of the performance
outcomes of these relationships. The theory is often
characterized as being divided into three interrelated streams: descriptive, normative, and instrumental (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). The focus
of this article is instrumental stakeholder theory
(IST), although we recognize that there are both
descriptive and normative elements in our narrative (cf. Harris & Freeman, 2008). Specifically, the
core hypothesis of IST is that developing stakeholder relationships governed by the norms of
traditional ethics—for example, fairness, trustworthiness, loyalty, care, and respect (Hendry,
2001, 2004)—will lead to improved financial
We greatly appreciate the constructive advice we received
from former associate editor Mike Pfarrer and three anonymous reviewers during the preparation of this manuscript.
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performance effects of IST-based measures and to
provide guidance to practicing managers.
First, although much of the IST literature explains why highly ethical treatment of stakeholders should be valuable, thus far there has not
been a thorough evaluation of such an approach
against the other resource-based criteria that help
identify potential sources of sustainable competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Barney & Wright,
1998). Specifically, are the resources/capabilities
that result from IST-based stakeholder treatment
also rare and difficult to imitate? As noted by
Freeman, Harrison, Wicks, Parmar, and de Colle,
“The theoretical links between stakeholder theory
and the resource-based view have not been adequately established in the minds of many strategic
management scholars” (2010: 95).
Second, prior IST scholarship has noted that close
relationships with stakeholders, developed through
ethical treatment, can have a number of benefits
(e.g., Bosse & Coughlan, 2016; Cooper & Gardner,
1993; Larson, 1992; Uzzi, 1997). However, most of the
field has displayed a “sunny-side” bias, and only
a few scholars have begun to consider the costs of
close relationships with stakeholders (e.g., GarciaCastro & Francoeur, 2016; Harrison & Bosse, 2013).
Third, in traditional IST there is the general
assumption that ethically grounded stakeholder
management strategies will be associated with
higher financial performance, regardless of context.1 But it is probable that the link is stronger,
nonexistent, or even negative in various contexts.
Like Bridoux and Stoelhorst (2014, 2016), we believe that identification of moderating influences
is critical to the stakeholder discussion. Moderators are particularly important given that the
business environment seems to be changing in
important ways—that is, it is becoming more dynamic, knowledge intensive, and interdependent.
As such, this article raises the question: Is an ISTbased stakeholder management approach becoming a more or less viable means of achieving
sustainable competitive advantage, given changes
to the business environment?

1
Exceptions can be found in the theoretical work of Bridoux
and Stoelhorst (2014, 2016) and in the empirical work of GarciaCastro and Francouer (2016). We extend the former work
by including more moderators, specifically moderators that
are closely associated with pervasive environmental forces.
The latter work does not directly speak to firm/stakeholder
relationships.
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In this article, rather than examining IST solely
from the perspective of various programs and
policies firms implement unilaterally that have
either helpful or harmful effects on stakeholders
(as much of the extant IST literature has done), we
use relational theory to examine the nature of the
two-way interactions that develop between managers and stakeholders. In so doing we draw on
relational models (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2016;
Fiske, 1992) and arm’s-length versus embedded
relationships (Uzzi, 1997). This approach answers
a call from Jones: “Instead of examining company
policies and specific actions, researchers should
be examining the content and nature of the relationships themselves” (2011: 60).
A relational approach provides greater specification to the claim that the prescriptions of IST can
lead to sustainable competitive advantage. At the
core of these arguments is the idea that a firm’s
ethics (ground rules) for managing relations
with stakeholders can lead to the development of
a capability that can be a source of sustainable
competitive advantage. Sustainable competitive
advantage, in turn, can be defined as a firm’s ability
to persistently create more economic value than the
marginal (breakeven) competitor in its product
market (Peteraf & Barney, 2003). Specifically, we
argue that a communal sharing relational ethics
(CSRE) strategy, characterized by an intention to
rely on relational contracts, joint wealth creation,
high levels of mutual trust and cooperation, and
communal sharing of property, can lead to what we
call a “close relationship capability.” A close relationship capability helps a firm cocreate more
economic value with stakeholders. We also examine a close relationship capability’s potential to be
rare and difficult to imitate, thus explaining why
such an approach can be a source of sustainable
competitive advantage.
We provide a balanced perspective of a close
relationship capability by examining incremental
costs associated with developing and maintaining
it. We explain further that the costs of developing
this capability will vary, depending on the existing
stakeholder culture of the firm (Jones, Felps, &
Bigley, 2007). Thus, stakeholder culture serves as
a firm-specific moderator that ultimately influences
the value proposition (i.e., benefits less costs)
associated with developing and maintaining
a close relationship capability. In addition, we
extend the limited research on moderators of the
relationship between an IST-based stakeholder
management approach and firm performance by
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explaining why dynamic, knowledge-intensive,
and interdependent environments increase the
potential benefits associated with a close relationship capability.
To preview the structure of the article, we first
introduce the concept of relational ethics strategies, explain the CSRE strategy, and contrast it
with the arm’s-length relational ethics (ALRE)
strategy. We argue that the desired outcome of
a CSRE strategy is a close relationship capability.
We then provide a succinct review of the IST literature as it relates to how a close relationship
capability can provide incremental value, the first
of the standard resource-based criteria. We also
discuss the incremental costs of developing
a close relationship capability through a CSRE
strategy, noting that a capability is only valuable
if the benefits associated with creating and
maintaining it outweigh the costs. We argue also
that these costs are less for firms that have an
existing culture that is other-regarding. Having
established the potential of a close relationship
capability to provide incremental value, we examine three plausible contextual moderators. We
then screen the close relationship capability using the other resource-based criteria of rarity and
imitability. In the final section we discuss the
implications of this more refined IST perspective
for research and practice. Figure 1 contains a
model of the proposed relationships among our
primary constructs.2
To our knowledge, we are the first to rigorously apply the resource-based criteria to an
evaluation of how the strategy of interacting
ethically with stakeholders relates to the sustainability of competitive advantage. Doing so
provides a stronger rationale for managers to
adopt such a strategy in their own firms. It also
helps us understand why the associated capability is rare, in spite of its apparent economic
attractiveness. By identifying the factors that
make such a strategy hard to imitate, we help
clarify what firm managers must focus on if they
are going to be successful in implementing it.
Our ultimate ambition in this article, as with
most IST, is to identify situations where managers could change their behaviors in ways that
improve both firm profits and stakeholder
welfare.
2
The lines in Figure 1 associated with the resource-based
criteria are dotted (and do not have arrows) because they are
definitional features rather than causal variables.
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RELATIONAL ETHICS STRATEGIES
We frame our analysis in terms of a firm’s relational ethics strategy.3 Each word in this concept
label deserves specification. First, as with any
term used by the population at large, “relational”
and “relationship” are used in many different
ways (Reis, Collins, & Berscheid, 2000). Here we
are using “relational” to refer to consensually
held role expectations that emerge during interactions between members of a dyad (Hinde,
1997; Sluss, van Dick, & Thompson, 2011). The dyad
we consider is the focal firm and a stakeholder
group.4 Second, the element of the relationship we
focus on has to do with ethics. How we treat others is
a core concept in ethics. Relational expectations
can involve many very specific schema that have
little to do with ethics (Baldwin, 1992)—for example,
the place where interactions will occur. We are interested in the ethical elements of relationships.
Third, strategy refers to the shared plans and initiatives of general managers, involving utilization of resources to achieve a firm’s aims (Nag,
Hambrick, & Chen, 2007). Specifically, the element
of strategy in question is what kind of relational
ethics to form with a stakeholder group. Importantly, the intended strategy may not be realized
and may change over time. Indeed, relationships
take time to mature, and how they develop depends
on the actions of both dyad members (Bosse &
Coughlan, 2016). As such, we use “strategy” to refer
to the preferred/intended relational ethics that

3
We use the term ethics strategy fully aware that some
ethicists will regard this usage as self-contradictory. In this
view, ethics employed instrumentally is not ethics at all. That
is, authenticity and moral motives are essential to ethics. Here
we regard a strategy as intended behavior, regardless of the
motivation it is based on.
4
Stakeholder relationships can be conceived of at different
levels of abstraction (Bosse & Coughlan, 2016; Sluss &
Ashforth, 2008): between individuals, between the firm and
a specific stakeholder group, or between the firm and all
stakeholders simultaneously. Low levels of abstraction—for
example, relationships between specific individuals—are
going to be more accurate predictors of individual behavior but
are much more complex. High levels of abstraction—for example, relationships between the firm and all stakeholders
simultaneously—seem analytically simpler but raise difficult
methodological questions of how to empirically combine relationships across stakeholders and are likely to be less empirically predictive. We believe that, in trying to understand
drivers of firm performance, the level of abstraction that is the
most empirically and practically useful is that of the relationship between the firm and a stakeholder group. As such, that is
the level of abstraction at which our theory is pitched.
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FIGURE 1
Linking a CSRE Strategy to Sustainable Competitive Advantage
Contextual moderators
- Environmental dynamism
- Knowledge intensity
- Stakeholder interdependence
(+)
(+)
CSRE strategy
(as compared with
an ALRE strategy)

Close
relationship
capability

(+)

Incremental value of a
close relationship
capability
- Reciprocal coordination
- Knowledge sharing
- Higher-quality
stakeholders
- Lower transaction costs
- Moral motivation

(+)

(+)

Valuable
capability

(+)

Competitive
advantage

(+)

(+)

Potential for
sustainable
competitive
advantage

(-)
(-)
(+)
Firm-specific
moderator
Successful
implementation of
CSRE strategy

- Other-regardingness
of firm’s existing
ethical culture

Incremental costs of a
close relationship
capability
- Potential nonreciprocation
- Generous bargaining
- Unprofitable loyalty
- Potential cost of changing
stakeholder culture

a firm seeks vis-à-vis a stakeholder, rather than
the realized relational ethics.
Note that these three dimensions assume that
members of a firm will be consistent in the way
they treat a particular stakeholder group—that
is, they will follow the relational ethics strategy.
This position is consistent with Brickson (2007),
who argued that firms interact with their stakeholders in consistent patterns. Specifically, our
claim is that norms regarding relationships
with stakeholder groups are communicated and
reinforced by firm managers through words and
actions and that they become ground rules for
action. These norms are not merely the result of
aggregating the values of employees within
a firm. Firms are not democracies. Rather, particular managers, typically those highest in the
governance hierarchy, have the greatest influence on the norms that are established (de Luque,
Washburn, Waldman, & House, 2008; Mayer,
Kuenzi, Greenbaum, Bardes, & Salvador, 2009).
Relational ethics strategies are unlikely to be
consistently applied unless general managers
lead the effort. They can do so through the role
modeling of appropriate stakeholder treatment;
the decisions they make; the management structure they establish; the information they give priority; their communication in speeches, meetings,
personal interactions, and written communications of many types; and the people they hire, reward, promote, and dismiss.
As in some other models of relational orientations (e.g., Cooper & Gardner, 1993), we focus on

RBV criterion
- Value exceeds
costs

RBV criterion
- Rarity of close
relationship
capability

RBV criterion
- Inimitability
of close
relationship
capability

two very different types of relational ethics strategies: self-interested, market-oriented strategies
based on ALRE and highly joint interest–oriented
strategies based on CSRE.5 We explain these two
strategies as ideal types to facilitate a more focused comparison of their essential characteristics. However, it is important to recognize that
these types are really points on a continuum, with
some relational ethics strategies falling somewhere between the two and some falling outside
of this range. The distribution of relationships
along the arm’s-length to communal sharing
range of the continuum is an open empirical
question. However, based on arguments presented below, we expect that a far greater number
fall near the arm’s-length point on the continuum.
ALRE
ALRE strategies can be defined as a shared intention among a firm’s general managers to relate
5

Semantic conventions among these models are varied, but
the fundamental differences between the archetypes remain
profound. Examples include relational versus transactional
exchanges (MacNeil, 1974), relational versus explicit contracts
(Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 2002), embedded versus arm’slength relationships (Uzzi, 1997), and communal versus exchange relationships (Mills & Clark, 1984). Also, while we focus
on the arm’s-length versus communal dimension of relationships, there are surely other dimensions—for example,
whether the relationships are egalitarian versus hierarchical.
These other dimensions represent attractive topics for future
research.
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to a stakeholder group based on the norms of arm’slength relationships. Arm’s-length relationships
form a sort of “baseline” economic theory examining economic exchanges in competitive markets
(Powell, 1990; Uzzi, 1997). Firms and stakeholders
that establish arm’s-length relationships regularly
switch exchange partners. Price data are the key
determinants of exchange, and firms rely on
switching cost barriers for repeated transactions.
There are a number of specific behavioral manifestations of an ALRE strategy. To begin with,
the dominant exchange modes of ALRE strategies
are discrete transactions or detailed, temporally
bounded formal contracts, with little concern for
future interactions, in the context of fair market
competition. ALRE strategies involve bargaining
with stakeholders at arm’s length with the intent of
maximizing the firm’s interests. Power differentials and information asymmetries are exploited
where present. While moral considerations do not
enter into ALRE-based transactions or negotiations, participants are expected to comply
with generally understood rules/norms of market
interactions—what Hendry (2001) calls “market
morality.” This means that ALRE strategies are
consistent with obeying the law and adhering to
relevant regulations. Those in arm’s-length relationships bargain in good faith and expect to
honor the explicit terms of the resulting contracts,
which are mostly written and formal. But disputes
involving significant sums are typically resolved
through legal mechanisms. While information
asymmetries may be exploited, blatant deceit is
generally avoided. An ALRE strategy would be
consistent with Milton Friedman’s argument that
“the social responsibility of business is to increase
its profits . . . without deception or fraud” (1970:
124).6
CSRE
CSRE strategies can be defined as a shared
intention among a firm’s general managers to
6

We must acknowledge that not all firms engaging in
arm’s-length relationships adhere to these standards. Some
firms may embrace a strategy of regularly acting unethically
toward stakeholders and use deceit, fraud, threats of violence,
and corruption to accomplish strategic aims (Greve et al., 2010).
However, such strategies appear to be relatively rare and unsustainable in the long run (Sullivan, Haunschild, & Page,
2007), even in transitional economies where the rule of law is
weak (Zheng, Luo, & Wang, 2014). As such, patently unethical
strategies are outside the scope of our analysis.
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develop a relationship with a stakeholder group
based on the norms of communal sharing as they
apply to economic relationships. These relational
strategies include an assumed shared future, and
they are associated with a number of specific
behavioral manifestations.
To begin with, firms pursuing CSRE rely on relational contracting. Rather than being specific,
explicit, and temporally bounded contracts, the
promises involved in relational contracting are
general, implicit, and open-ended commitments to
cooperate voluntarily and generously with partners
in joint wealth creation efforts. CSRE strategies
keep the prospect of a continuing relationship
firmly in mind, relying on mutual trust and trustworthiness to maintain reciprocal loyalty. Because
the terms of these contracts are invariably unclear
and nearly impossible to enforce, they are “sustained by the shadow of the future” and/or internal
moral constraints, rather than third-party enforcement (Gibbons & Henderson, 2012: 1350). Formal
contracts, when they are necessary, are often
left purposefully indefinite to allow “wiggle
room” to make things fair (Scott, 2003). If
problems emerge—for instance, because of
changes in economic conditions or regulatory
environments—they are settled in a cooperative
manner (e.g., by seeking equitable solutions
rather than establishing blame). Under these
circumstances, two objectives are paramount:
resolving the problem at hand and maintaining
the integrity of the relationship. As such, litigation is seen as a last resort and is employed only
under dire circumstances because it would signal the end of the CSRE strategy. Trusting behaviors reflect a desire to cooperate extensively
for mutual gain.
CSRE strategies involve willingness to share
property (especially intellectual property) without
regard for either its proprietary value or its potential appropriation by relationship partners.
Information asymmetries will not be exploited
and, since information relevant to the success
of the joint effort is voluntarily shared, may cease
to exist. Negotiations between the firm and its
stakeholders seek to satisfy both side’s needs.
In sum, a CSRE strategy manifests in the behaviors of keeping promises, relying on relational
contracts, refraining from taking advantage of
power imbalances or information asymmetries,
willingly sharing relevant information, treating
property as a communal resource, making voluntary contributions to joint efforts, and addressing
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emerging problems and settling disputes in a cooperative manner. A CSRE strategy is consistent
with, but a substantial extension of, some existing
formulations of IST, which tend to focus on mutual
trust, cooperation, and justice (Harrison et al.,
2010; Jones, 1995). Importantly, while we submit
that firms with CSRE strategies are rare, behaviors consistent with a CSRE strategy do exist,
as is made clear in a number of case studies
(e.g., Browning, Beyer, & Shetler, 1995; Doz, 1996;
Larson, 1992; Uzzi, 1997). More specifically,
Browning et al. described the development of
a “moral community in which individuals and
firms made contributions to the industry without
regard for immediate and specific payback” in the
semiconductor industry’s manufacturing technology consortium SEMATECH (1995: 113). Similarly, Doz (1996) noted that GE and Snecma’s
(successful) joint jet engine program featured
substantial trust and cooperation. In another wellknown example, the Japanese auto industry is
characterized by strategies compatible with close
relationships, as opposed to manifestations of
arm’s-length relationships, such as explicit contracts (Nishiguchi, 1994; Ouchi & Jaeger, 1978).
CSRE TO CLOSE RELATIONSHIP CAPABILITY
TO SUSTAINABLE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
Firms that successfully implement a CSRE
strategy are assumed to have the ability to create
a communal sharing relationship with a stakeholder. This close relationship capability is the
ability to convince members of the stakeholder
group to treat the firm as a close relation. Treating
the firm as a close relation (Reis et al., 2000) is
synonymous with having a commitment bond—
that is, “a volitional psychological bond reflecting
dedication to and responsibility for a particular
target” (Bosse & Coughlan, 2016: 1207)—or adopting a communal sharing relational model visà-vis the firm (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2016; Fiske,
1992).
Of course, successfully implementing a CSRE
strategy can be quite demanding, requiring both
skill and effort on the part of managers. Therefore,
close relationship capabilities are both rare and
difficult to imitate, as well as valuable (as described in detail below). Nonetheless, managers
have several “tools” at their disposal to pursue
successful implementation. As described above,
these tools include role-modeling behavior, the
substance of decisions and the priorities revealed
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in those decisions, the establishment of compatible management structures, informational priorities, written and verbal communications in
various venues and forms, and personal interactions, as well as hiring, firing, rewarding,
and promoting decisions. Therefore, according to
the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm, if a
close relationship capability can be shown to be
valuable, rare, and difficult to imitate, it becomes
a potential source of sustainable competitive
advantage. We devote much of the remainder of
this section to demonstrating that these criteria
are met.
The Value of a Close Relationship Capability
Here we review arguments found in the IST and
related bodies of literature that are most closely
linked to the idea that a close relationship capability can provide benefits not available to firms
that do not possess such a capability. Building on
prior work, we argue that additional economic
value is created in a firm with a close relationship
capability as stakeholders are motivated to contribute more to joint value creation and, importantly, as value creation processes become more
effective. Our definition of value as economic
value is consistent with the RBV literature (Peteraf
& Barney, 2003), but we do not claim that the value
we describe will be directly correlated with financial profits or shareholder returns. As Coff
(1999) made clear, the profits of a business will not
reflect the true value it creates if too much of that
value is siphoned off by stakeholders with strong
bargaining power. Or, in the case of a firm pursuing a CSRE strategy, much of the incremental
value could be distributed back to stakeholders
during the course of business such that bottomline profitability may not reflect all of the additional value created. We do claim, however, that
additional value will be available to participants
in the joint value creation efforts of firms that
enjoy the benefits of a close relationship capability (cf. Tantalo & Priem, 2016) and that, according to the norms of communal sharing, the
additional value should be distributed fairly.7
This value comes from improved reciprocal
7
Given that the partners are expected to distribute the costs
and benefits of the joint effort fairly, the probability that the
focal firm will end up with an unfairly small share is low, and
the probability that it will end up with none of the incremental
value seems miniscule.
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coordination, knowledge sharing, attracting highquality stakeholders, lower transaction costs, and
greater moral motivation.
We should state from the outset that each of
these sources of value requires particular behaviors on the part of the firm that are similar to
what it expects from stakeholders. For example,
reciprocal coordination is a cooperative two-way
process, so a firm that expects its stakeholders to
share valuable knowledge should share valuable
knowledge with its stakeholders. In a sense, then,
the incremental sources of value we are about to
explain also contain an implied set of behaviors
for firms that pursue a CSRE strategy. We should
note also that these behaviors are entirely consistent with a reliance on relational contracts and
property sharing.
Improved reciprocal coordination. Management
scholars dating back to Barnard (1938) and Thompson
(1967) have regarded coordination as essential to
organizational success. Thompson (1967) described
three modes of coordination. Reciprocal coordination, where needed contributions depend on
the nature and extent of previous contributions
and mutual adjustment is required, is most relevant to communal sharing relationships. Communal sharing relationships function without
elaborate plans, rules, or contracts (Bridoux &
Stoelhorst, 2016). Indeed, plans, rules, and contracts are poor substitutes for mutual adjustment
when tasks involve reciprocal interdependence
(Barki & Pinsonneault, 2005). In such highly interdependent tasks, reciprocal coordination enables the creation of higher-quality products/
services at quicker speeds (Larson, 1992; Uzzi,
1997). In short, a close relationship capability is
potentially valuable because it allows firms
to engage in reciprocal coordination more efficiently, resulting in better products and services and more rapid adaptation to changing
conditions.
Knowledge sharing. A number of scholars have
emphasized the importance of ethical norms and
“relationship quality” on the effective utilization
and dissemination of knowledge between parties
(Hosmer, 1994; Larson, 1992; Su, 2014; Uzzi, 1997).
The importance of knowledge as a source of competitive advantage has long been appreciated
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Firms engaged in joint
efforts often share knowledge and benefit from
knowledge received from stakeholders. Although much knowledge is generated and stored
by employees (Argote, 1999), learning from other
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stakeholders is also important for competitive
success (Harrison et al., 2010; von Hippel, 1988).
Knowledge has at least three attributes that
distinguish it from other forms of property (e.g.,
manufacturing equipment, real estate), and each
is relevant to the close relationship capability
employed to make use of it (Dosi, Malerba,
Ramello, & Silva, 2006). First, knowledge is appropriable; once disclosed, others can use it free
of charge.8 Second, knowledge may be useful only
when combined with other capabilities, such as
knowledge from other stakeholders, and the value
of both the combination and the contributions of
individual partners are unknown a priori. Third,
much knowledge is tacit and cannot easily be
transferred formally from one partner to another
(Nelson & Winter, 1982). In some situations the
value of formally transferred knowledge is reduced substantially without the concomitant
transfer of tacit knowledge. Full-value knowledge
transfers often involve ongoing and close interactions between the transferor and the transferee. A close relationship capability involves
shared perspectives and shared vocabularies
that are necessary for the transmission of subtle
forms of tacit knowledge (Larson, 1992; von Hippel,
1988). In a mixed-methods empirical study, Uzzi
(1997) found that “embedded” relationships were
characterized by high-quality (i.e., detailed, tacit,
and holistic) information exchanges. In sharp
contrast, a firm having an arm’s-length relationship with a stakeholder is likely to be unaware
of useful tacit knowledge because there is more
psychological distance and less trust in the relationship. In sum, a close relationship capability has the benefit of facilitating high-quality
knowledge sharing between a firm and a stakeholder group.
Attracting high-quality stakeholders. Because
the joint value creation processes that are the focus of this article may only be as strong as the
weakest partner involved, attracting “high-quality”
stakeholders is of considerable importance.
There are a couple of reasons that a close relationship capability is likely to be attractive to
high-quality stakeholders. First, stakeholders
may be attracted to these firms because they feel
as though they are participating in something
8

Of course, patent law provides some protection against
this sort of appropriation. However, many ideas are not patentable, and many others are not worth the time and trouble. In
any case, litigation is expensive.
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“larger than themselves”—an opportunity not
readily available if firms rely exclusively on
market-based, arm’s-length transactions to
manage relations with stakeholders (Turban &
Greening, 1997; Valentine, Godkin, Fleischman,
Kidwell, & Page, 2011).
Second, because communal sharing relationships tend to create more value than other relational forms (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2016), and
because that value is expected to be distributed
fairly among participants, firms with a close relationship capability may be able to attract
stakeholders with more valuable portfolios of attributes (Tantalo & Priem, 2016). One of the most
important of these attributes is the ability to adhere to the relational norms that lead to greater
wealth creation. That is, for firms pursuing
a CSRE strategy, the “quality” of a stakeholder
depends, in part, on whether the stakeholder is
willing and able to adhere to the norms of close
relationships. Such stakeholders can be expected
to openly and voluntarily contribute to the joint
wealth creation effort of the focal firm in conjunction with other relevant stakeholders. This
attribute is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for stakeholder superiority, because without
it the stakeholder becomes an inappropriate
partner for a communal sharing relationship. Of
course, the resources and skills the stakeholder
brings to the joint value creation process are also
important.
Lower transaction costs. Jones (1995) described
the transaction cost advantages associated with
a relationship capability based on mutual trust
and cooperation—advantages that would certainly apply to a firm with a close relationship
capability. The basic idea is that an atmosphere
of trust and an absence of opportunistic behavior
make frequently renegotiated, detailed, formal
contracts with elaborate safeguards unnecessary
(see also Barney & Hansen, 1994). Furthermore,
since incidents of breach of implicit contracts will
be infrequent and will tend to be settled amicably
among the parties, expensive legal costs can be
avoided (Kessler & Leider, 2011; Scott, 2003).
Greater moral motivation. Another benefit of
a close relationship capability is that it can motivate loyalty to or additional effort expended on
behalf of the firm (Hosmer, 1994). Many stakeholders will exert effort to help the firm as a going
concern if they have a commitment bond with
the firm (Bosse & Coughlan, 2016). Conversely,
many stakeholders will go out of their way, and
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sometimes go against their own self-interest, to
punish firms that have treated them unfairly (Fehr
& Schmidt, 2006; Hayibor, 2017). This may involve lawsuits, boycotts, strikes, spreading negative sentiment, or simple refusal to transact
with a company with which one has a poor
relationship.
Another manifestation of moral motivation is
lower team production problems. Team production problems can emerge when the contributions of individual members to a joint effort are
difficult to isolate. Such situations give individual
members an incentive to “shirk” or “free ride” on
the contributions of others and could arise in firm/
stakeholder relationships such as alliances and
joint ventures. While Jones (1995) argued that
mutual trust and cooperation are ways to reduce
team production costs, the norms associated with
communal sharing relationships could eliminate
them entirely (Wagner, 1995).
In sum, a close relationship capability has the
potential to lead to higher levels of joint value
creation because of more efficient reciprocal coordination, knowledge sharing advantages, the
ability to attract higher-quality stakeholders,
reduced transaction costs, and greater moral
motivation. We now consider incremental costs
associated with developing and maintaining
a close relationship capability through a CSRE
strategy.
Incremental Costs of Developing and
Maintaining a Close Relationship Capability
Similar to most of the IST literature, the foregoing discussion largely extolled the unique
benefits of a close relationship capability. However, the CSRE strategy used to develop and
maintain a close relationship capability may entail costs that a firm relying on arm’s-length relations can avoid. Of course, the relevant value of
a close relationship capability is its net value—
benefits less incremental costs. We now describe
three types of incremental costs particular to the
development and maintenance of a close relationship capability, with a fourth type of cost
described in the next section.
Potential nonreciprocation. Among the most
important of these costs is the possibility that
a stakeholder will not abide by the norms of
communal sharing despite the firm’s generous
sharing of resources—for example, time, effort,
and (proprietary) knowledge—that may have
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great value (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2014). This could
occur as a failure of the intended relationship to
emerge at all with a particular stakeholder, or it
could occur as a breakdown of an existing close
relationship with a stakeholder. A related cost is the
risk that a stakeholder may exploit the firm because
of the limited use of formal protective contracts. An
associated cost is the additional resources devoted
to searching for suitable stakeholders to engage
with, or developing a stakeholder relationship to
the point where they are willing to reciprocate. Just
as few firms actually follow a CSRE strategy to the
point that they fully develop a close relationship
capability, stakeholders willing to abide by the
norms of CSRE may also be rare.
Overly generous bargaining. Another incremental cost of the CSRE strategy could be an overly
generous allocation of jointly created value back
to one or more of the stakeholders who helped create it (Harrison & Bosse, 2013; Harrison et al., 2010).
Arm’s-length relationships require only the contractually agreed upon allocation of value based on
self-interested bargaining, providing an opportunity for a firm to extract large amounts of value from
a relationship based on aggressive bargaining
tactics, power imbalances, or favorable information
asymmetries (Coff, 1999). In contrast, substantially
unfair distributions of created value are unlikely in
a communal sharing relationship; neither of the
parties will engage in aggressive value appropriation based on advantageous circumstances. In
sum, firms pursuing a CSRE strategy could get
a smaller slice of a larger pie.
Unprofitable loyalty. Finally, a firm that adopts
CSRE will tend to be loyal to a stakeholder it has
developed a communal sharing relationship with,
even if that stakeholder ceases to provide adequate value to the joint value creation process
(Uzzi, 1997). A firm might continue the relationship
because of the values it has adopted in consequence of its CSRE strategy but also because
ending a relationship could send a negative
signal to other stakeholders about the firm’s
commitment to communal sharing values, thus
weakening its close relationship capability. Irrespective of reason, such unprofitable loyalty
could prevent the firm from engaging new stakeholders with more valuable capabilities.
This description of potential costs raises the
question: Under what circumstances will the benefits of a close relationship capability outweigh the
costs of pursuing it through a CSRE strategy—that
is, when will a close relationship capability lead to
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sustainable competitive advantage? Our approach to understanding these benefit/cost balances is to identify the contexts in which a close
relationship capability is likely to have the greatest net value (i.e., benefits minus costs). We begin
by explaining the probable influence of a firm’s
existing ethical culture on the costs associated
with implementing a CSRE strategy in managing
relations with a stakeholder group.
Other-Regardingness of a Firm’s Ethical Culture
In this section we contend that firms differ in
how costly it is for them to develop a close relationship capability with a stakeholder group
through a CSRE strategy. In addition to the costs
mentioned in the previous section, we introduce
a fourth category—the costs associated with
adjusting a firm’s culture such that it is supportive
of a CSRE strategy. Without this support, the CSRE
strategy would likely fail to produce a close relationship capability. In particular, we predict
that it will be less costly for a firm to develop
a close relationship capability with a stakeholder
group if the firm already has an ethical culture
consistent with such a relational model.
There are several different ways of describing
a firm’s ethical culture (for a good review see
Mayer, 2014), but the version that seems most
relevant here is stakeholder cultures, developed
by Jones and colleagues (2007). These authors
posit a continuum of ethical orientations toward
stakeholders, ranging from completely selfregarding to completely other-regarding. They
identify “ideal types” along this continuum—
consisting of (1) agency cultures, (2) corporate egoist
cultures, (3) instrumentalist cultures, and (4) moralist cultures9—in order of an increasingly otherregarding (as opposed to self-regarding) focus. We
propose that the further a firm’s stakeholder
culture is from the moralist/other-regarding end
of the continuum, the more expensive it will
be to effectively develop a close relationship
9

Jones and colleagues also mention the logical possibility
of an altruist stakeholder culture, which tries “to maximize the
other party’s outcome with less concern for their own” (2007:
140). The authors acknowledge that “altruist cultures are included for the sake of completeness” (2007: 149) and that “as
a practical matter, conditions of economic competition make
significant growth or proliferation of [altruist] companies improbable” (2007: 150). Given that such cultures are likely to be
exceedingly rare in a market economy, we do not consider
them further here.
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capability with a stakeholder group through
a CSRE strategy. This is because it would take
a large amount of management time and other
resources to (a) develop a close relationship capability with a stakeholder group that is in contradiction to the firm’s overall ethical culture or
(b) change the firm’s overall ethical culture to be
consistent with a close relationship capability.
To elaborate, let us briefly consider each of the
ideal types along the continuum. First, the costs of
a developing and maintaining a close relationship capability through a CSRE strategy will be
lowest for moralist cultures, which attempt to
adhere to moral principles in their relationships
with all of their stakeholders. Developing a close
relationship capability based around relational
contracts, joint wealth creation, cooperation, and
communal sharing of property should be comparatively easy for a firm with a moralist culture.
Second, the costs of pursuing a close relationship capability through a CSRE strategy will be
somewhat higher for instrumentalist cultures,
which ultimately care only about profit (or shareholder wealth) maximization but recognize that
is it often important to appear moral when interacting with stakeholders. In other words,
they are inauthentic moralist firms. However,
a good deal of scholarship suggests that stakeholders can detect ethical authenticity and that
this awareness can translate into value-adding
(or -destroying) behavior (Cording, Harrison,
Hoskisson, & Jonsen, 2014; Jones, 1995; Schultz,
Hatch, & Larsen, 2000). As such, instrumentally
ethical firms will have a harder time than moralist
firms convincing a stakeholder that they will conform to the norms of a close relationship. They will
have to allocate more resources to ensuring that
members of their own firm both understand and
conform to these norms to a sufficient degree that the
stakeholder is convinced and to making sure that
the norms are not violated so that the benefits of
a close relationship are fully realized. In terms of the
specific costs described previously, they will be
higher because there is a higher probability that the
stakeholder will not abide by the norms of communal sharing, in spite of the firm’s efforts to establish
such a relationship. If the stakeholder does not
conform, then additional value will not be created.
Third, the costs of developing a close relationship capability through a CSRE strategy will be
higher still for corporate egoist cultures, which
focus on short-term maximization of profits (or
shareholder wealth), aggressively contracting (at
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arm’s length) with their stakeholders to keep costs
down in order to compete successfully in their
product or service markets. The stance of a corporate egoist culture is clearly in contradiction to
the norms of close relationships. Successfully
enacting a close relationship with a particular
stakeholder group while having a larger ethical
culture opposed to such a strategy will be expensive and likely to fail.
Fourth, we contend that the costs of developing
a close relationship capability through a CSRE
strategy are highest for agency cultures, characterized by self-interest at the individual level such that
the interests of the firm itself are advanced only to the
extent that internal incentives link personal and
corporate goals. The gap between agency cultures
and a close relationship capability can only be described as enormous, as will be the costs and the
amount of time it will take to bridge the gap. Therefore, the net value (and the resulting sustainable
competitive advantage) of pursuing a close relationship capability with a stakeholder group will be
smallest for firms starting out with agency cultures.
MODERATORS OF THE VALUE OF A CLOSE
RELATIONSHIP CAPABILITY
It is possible that while a CSRE strategy (and the
resulting close relationship capability) will add value
in some contexts, it could be less effective than an
ALRE strategy in other contexts. We have already
explained why the degree of other-regardingness
found in a firm’s existing ethical culture is a firmspecific moderator influencing the incremental
costs of developing a close relationship capability through the CSRE strategy. Here we evaluate
environmental dynamism, knowledge intensity,
and task and outcome interdependence as key
elements in determining the extent to which a
close relationship capability is more valuable.
We focus on these three moderators because they
collectively represent increasingly important
elements of the twenty-first-century economy
(Dicken, 2011; Powell & Snellman, 2004). Indeed,
these three moderators are interrelated.
Many firms have changed dramatically as they
have attempted to cope with environmental dynamism (Dess & Beard, 1984), the term used to
describe rapid and pervasive environmental
change. One of the most influential forms of
dynamism has resulted from the rapid advancement of information technology, which has put a
premium on the creation and dissemination of
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knowledge (Powell & Snellman, 2004). To cope
with—and as a result of—dynamism and the
“knowledge economy,” firms have become much
more interdependent (Dicken, 2011). Because the
strength of these general forces is likely to vary
from industry to industry, we will now evaluate
their potential as moderators of the relationship
between a firm’s close relationship capability and
sustainable competitive advantage.
Environmental Dynamism
Dynamic, “high-velocity” industries (e.g., software
development, innovative electronics, health care,
some segments of the fashion industry) require
constant adaptation to new competitive, technological, and regulatory conditions (Dess &
Beard, 1984). A firm with a close relationship capability is in a stronger position to create value in
a dynamic context (Joshi & Campbell, 2003). A
close relationship capability should facilitate the
required rapid transfer of information. The skills
associated with reciprocal coordination will also
be helpful in organizing activities in dynamic
environments. In addition, in an environment that
is changing rapidly, written contracts associated
with arm’s-length relationships will quickly become outdated, requiring frequent adjustments
and increasing the possibility of opportunistic
behavior. This can be expected to lead to time
delays. In addition, partners continually involved
in rewriting contracts will experience increased
transaction costs. In this situation transaction
costs associated with a CSRE strategy are likely
to be lower than those associated with an ALRE
strategy (Joshi & Campbell, 2003).
Knowledge Intensity
The kind of adaptation needed to thrive in
knowledge-intensive industries (e.g., high-tech
industries, pharmaceuticals, health care) requires the transfer of information among stakeholders (Harrison & Thompson, 2015). Not all firm/
stakeholder relationships are dependent on
extensive knowledge sharing. Knowledge intensity can be defined “as the extent to which
a firm depends on the knowledge inherent in its
activities and outputs as a source of competitive
advantage” (Autio, Sapienza, & Almeida, 2000:
913). On the one hand, knowledge-intensive
businesses rely on knowledge creation and
transfer as a primary means of generating value.
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Firms that depend on knowledge intensity are
more likely to rely on the knowledge sharing
skills associated with a close relationship capability. Also, because knowledge is such an
appropriable resource (Dosi et al., 2006), firms
must be able to trust that a stakeholder will not
act opportunistically when provided with proprietary or especially valuable knowledge.
Thus, a close relationship capability is expected to be particularly valuable in knowledgeintensive environments. On the other hand,
if knowledge is not particularly critical to a firm’s
strategy and competitiveness, as in low-tech
businesses, an arm’s-length relationship may be
more efficient.
Task and Outcome Interdependence
Bridoux and Stoelhorst (2016) have suggested
that communal sharing relationships are particularly efficient in environments with high task
and outcome interdependence. Comparing these
sorts of conditions with conditions in which there is
high task and outcome independence can help to
substantiate their claim. Task and outcome independence is found in industries where firms
produce products in-house, through simple production processes, or with simple inputs from relatively few stakeholders (e.g., commodities, fast
foods, standardized components such as nuts and
bolts). In these environments the additional costs
associated with a CSRE strategy are less likely to
be offset by the incremental value created from
possession of a close relationship capability. In
fact, there are likely to be economic advantages
to aggressive bargaining in order to obtain the
lowest market prices available for required
inputs.
The situation is reversed in industries with
long and complicated value chains where the
norm is for multiple stakeholders to participate in supplying pieces of the final product
(e.g., aerospace, automobiles, health care). Because complex products or production processes
require inputs from multiple stakeholders, some
of them deeply involved in the design and production of the product involved, complex coordination will be required. These processes will
benefit greatly from the advantages in reciprocal coordination possessed by firms with
a close relationship capability. In an empirical
study of the fashion industry, Uzzi (1997) documented the value of reciprocal coordination in
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highly interdependent tasks (see also Larson,
1992).
In addition, because transaction costs are likely
to be higher where tasks and outcomes are interdependent, reducing them through the trust-based
governing mechanisms of a close relationship
capability can be quite valuable, thus increasing
the potential for sustainable competitive advantage. Firms with a close relationship capability
are able to engage in efficient relational contracting (rather than expensive formal written
contracting) and dispute resolution through cooperatives means (rather than expensive litigation).
Furthermore, because relevant information and
partner effort are contributed voluntarily, negotiations over who contributes what are dramatically
reduced. In short, the efficiencies associated with
transaction costs, along with those related to
reciprocal coordination, make a close relationship
capability particularly valuable in contexts of task
and outcome interdependence. Finally, task and
outcome interdependence, accompanied by greater
coordination requirements and transaction costs, is
likely to increase with the number of stakeholders
involved in the joint wealth creation effort.
The RBV’s Standards for Sustainable
Competitive Advantage
We have now reviewed the circumstances in
which the benefits of a close relationship capability are likely to be highest relative to the incremental costs of the CSRE strategy used to
develop and maintain it. In so doing we have
addressed the “valuable” criterion of the RBV of
the firm (Barney, 2011; Barney & Wright, 1998). In
this section we develop the argument that a close
relationship capability also holds the potential to
achieve a sustainable competitive advantage. As
pointed out by the RBV, a capability is only likely
to lead to superior firm performance in the long
run if (a) few other firms have the capability—that
is, it is rare—and (b) it would be very difficult and
expensive to copy—that is, it is inimitable (Barney
& Clark, 2007; Barney & Wright, 1998).10 Otherwise,
10

In early versions of the RBV, there was another criterion
for a resource to be a plausible source of sustained competitive
advantage: nonsubstitutability (Barney, 1991). However, nonsubstitutability can be folded into the valuable criterion—that
is, if there are no good substitutes for a resource, it is more
valuable. As such, more recent incarnations of the RBV do not
break out nonsubstitutability as a separate criterion (Barney &
Clark, 2007; Barney & Wright, 1998).
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other firms will just develop the capability and
compete away any superior returns. We now
consider why it is plausible that a close relationship capability may be rare despite being
valuable.
A close relationship capability is rare. A close
relationship capability is likely to be rare for a variety of reasons, and these reasons tend to fall into
the three categories described by Chen (1996): (1)
not being aware of the benefits, (2) not having the
proper motivation to pursue the requisite strategy,
or (3) being unable to implement the requisite
strategy successfully. We consider each in turn.
First, for the most part, business education and
the existing norms of the economic system have
stressed the pursuit of organizational self-interest
as the best means of achieving corporate goals
(Ferraro, Pfeffer, & Sutton, 2005; Ghoshal, 2005;
Mintzberg et al., 2002; Podolny, 2009). As a result,
arm’s-length transactions tend to be the default
position with regard to how firms manage relationships with their stakeholders (Bridoux &
Stoelhorst, 2016). If managers are to move away
from this default position, deliberate efforts must
be made to establish and reinforce the idea that the
values and behaviors associated with a CSRE
strategy are valid and desirable. However, managers may not be aware of the potential gains
available to their firms if they are able to develop
a close relationship capability. Managers may
push back at the notion of communal sharing in
favor of what is sometimes called “market morality” (Hendry, 2004), thinking that pursuing joint interests leads to inferior economic outcomes for the
firm. A related point is that managers may believe
that focusing on maximizing shareholder wealth is
morally required (Jones et al., 2007), particularly
since some influential thinkers have advanced
this position (for a review see Stout, 2012).
Second, several factors can reduce the motivation of managers to adopt CSRE norms in pursuit
of a close relationship capability. For instance,
many managers are subject to incentives—for
example, performance bonuses based on profit
targets—that direct their attention to short-term
goals. Indeed, the nature of incentives is that they
typically need to provide timely rewards for behavior that is tied to concrete outcomes (Aguinis,
Joo, & Gottfredson, 2013). Given the causal ambiguity and social complexity surrounding the
relationship between morality and financial outcomes, it is difficult to design incentives that effectively and precisely reward ethical behavior.
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Since developing communal sharing relationships is likely to be a long-term endeavor with
indeterminate outcomes, many unincentivized
managers may be reluctant to make the attempt.
In addition, revealing valuable proprietary information to a stakeholder partner without substantial safeguards can be seen as naive by peers
and can be quite costly if the partner proves untrustworthy. Psychologically and economically
“safe” strategies may be much more appealing to
many managers. Even managers willing to look
beyond their short-term self-interest may be discouraged by a realistic view of the difficulty of
successful adoption.
Third, relatively few firms will be able to implement a CSRE strategy successfully, thus
finding it difficult or impossible to develop
a close relationship capability. The ambitious
behavioral standards of CSRE are difficult to
achieve and sustain, particularly since approximately half of all individuals begin with social
dispositions that are either self-regarding and
individualistic—38 percent—or competitive—12
percent (Au & Kwong, 2004; Bridoux & Stoelhorst,
2016). Existing relational ethics norms within the
firm may be far removed from those of the CSRE
strategy (as we discussed in our section on costs
of CSRE strategies) or may be unclear or inconsistent. In addition, communal norms are
often more fragile than arm’s-length norms
(Chatman & Barsade, 1995) and are vulnerable to
perceived self-interested behavior or breaches
of trust (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2016; Lewicki &
Bunker, 1995). The unsuccessful clearing of these
hurdles, and the high costs of doing so, can lead
to a reversion to market pricing relationships
(Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2016) and arm’s-length
strategies.
Furthermore, suitable stakeholder partners
may be difficult to find. Such stakeholders must (1)
have the requisite capabilities to complement the
focal firm in their joint value creation effort, (2)
clear the formidable CSRE hurdles outlined
above, and (3) want to engage in such a relationship. Indeed, many potential stakeholders may be
conditioned to expect self-interested behavior in
any economic context (Ferraro et al., 2005) and
may be unwilling to trust that the focal firm is
actually benevolent. These fixed beliefs in selfinterest can be self-fulfilling such that it becomes
possible to interact only with such parties on
a transactional basis (Ferraro et al., 2005; Miller,
1999). For these reasons, we conclude that a close
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relationship capability will be rare and, thus,
may be a source of competitive advantage.
A close relationship capability is difficult to
imitate. The primary benefit of a close relationship capability—improved joint value creation
through more valuable information exchanges
and better coordinated activities—may be attractive to firms that are currently pursuing an
ALRE strategy. The question, then, is how difficult
it would be to imitate the CSRE strategy and
successfully develop the associated close relationship capability. Imitability is related to path
dependence (the manner in which firm’s resources develop over time), causal ambiguity
(difficulties in determining the sources of a firm’s
competitive strengths), and social complexity
(difficulties in replicating complex social phenomena; Barney, 1991, 2011). A firm’s close relationship capability is likely to be difficult to
imitate because it is highly dependent on the
manner in which the firm’s relationships with
stakeholders have evolved over time (path
dependence)—in some cases, considerable time.
In addition, since relationship quality is opaque
to outsiders, other firms are unlikely to understand the extent to which the firm’s sustainable competitive advantage is related to its
close relationship capability (causal ambiguity). Moreover, communal sharing relationships
are more socially complex than arm’s-length
relationships. Thus, according to the three wellaccepted criteria for inimitability, a close relationship capability will be difficult to imitate.
Because it is rare and difficult to imitate, we
conclude that a close relationship capability, in
contexts where the benefits exceed the costs, has
the potential to lead to a sustainable competitive
advantage.
DISCUSSION
In this article we set out to provide some answers to a question that should be quite important
to IST researchers but, to date, has drawn scant
attention. Simply put, if the ethical prescriptions of IST research are valuable, as theory
and empirical studies indicate they are, why are
these measures not the dominant mode of firm/
stakeholder relationships? This article addresses
this question by arguing that extant IST research has three significant shortcomings that
limit its usefulness to scholars and corporate
managers. First, virtually all IST-based studies
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make and defend claims that certain ethical
practices are valuable, but very few show them
to be rare or difficult to imitate—the other two
criteria for sustainable competitive advantage
according to the RBV. How can a practice yield
sustainable competitive advantage if many firms
are employing it or if firms can easily adopt it?
Second, while the benefits of certain ethical
practices have been well documented, the costs
of adopting them have been given scant attention. How can a practice be deemed valuable
if the costs of adopting it exceed the benefits
it yields? Third, few theoretical or empirical
efforts have considered the competitive context
in which a firm operates as relevant to ISTpredicted performance outcomes. Are the benefits
of ethical practices the same for firms that produce simple commodities—for example, nuts and
bolts or copier paper—as for firms producing cell
phones or complicated medical equipment?
In this article we examined how and under what
circumstances a stakeholder management strategy, based on a refined set of ethical norms associated with IST, is likely to lead to sustainable
competitive advantage. In so doing the article fills
a void in the extant IST literature. Specifically, to
summarize the argument: (1) Successfully adopting a relational ethics strategy consistent with
communal sharing relationships (a CSRE strategy)
results in a close relationship capability. (2) A close
relationship capability has a number of benefits,
including improved reciprocal coordination, better
knowledge sharing, attraction of higher-quality
stakeholders, lower transaction costs, and greater
moral motivation, and therefore is potentially
valuable. (3) A CSRE strategy—and, by extension,
a close relationship capability—also has some
costs, including the risks of generous resource
sharing being exploited (nonreciprocation), unnecessarily generous allocation of jointly created
value, and unprofitable loyalty. (4) The costs of
enacting a CSRE strategy are especially high
when the firm’s overall ethical culture is more
self-regarding than other-regarding. (5) The
benefits—and, by extension, the net value—of
a close relationship capability will be greater under certain circumstances, specifically under conditions of environmental dynamism, knowledge
intensity, and reciprocal interdependence with
stakeholders. (6) Even under conditions where the
benefits outweigh the costs, a close relationship
capability will be rare. And (7) it will be difficult to
imitate, so (8) there are conditions under which
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a close relationship capability is likely to be a
source of sustainable competitive advantage.
Extending the Theory
While the establishment of a close relationship
capability as a potential source of sustainable
competitive advantage fulfills the requirements
of the RBV, this capability is only an interim goal
for firms in a competitive market economy. Superior profitability is the ultimate goal. Therefore,
as a minor extension of our theory, we suggest
some potential directions for development of
a theoretical link between a close relationship
capability and actual sustainable competitive
advantage. We assume that stakeholders, existing and potential, will be attracted to a communal
sharing relationship within which they can cocreate value with the focal firm. This is certainly
not a heroic assumption because such relationships have real incremental value, as argued by
Bridoux and Stoelhorst (2016) and substantially
expanded on in this article. The details of how this
assumption can be developed into credible theory
will likely involve such questions as the following. How can the firm convey a willingness and
capability to engage in communal sharing relationships? What sorts of stakeholders will be
attracted to a potential communal sharing relationship? How will firms select stakeholders
with appropriate attributes? (An analysis of the
role of reputations will likely be useful here.) Can
firms convert existing arm’s-length relationships
into communal sharing relationships? If so, how?
Are such conversions likely to be more or less
difficult than establishing new relationships?
Scholars wishing to extend the theory will have to
deal with these questions, among others.
Understanding the Influence of Costs
and Context
We believe our model is the first to identify a
range of costs specific to close relationships. Of
particular interest for future research, we suggest
that close relationships may lead to unprofitable
loyalty (e.g., not laying off workers when there are
other laborers, perhaps in other countries, who
could do the same quality job for less money;
sticking with a supplier even when another supplier offers a similar product at a lower
price). Future research identifying these costs’
frequency, scope, and conditions of occurrence
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would help us to understand whether and when
a close relationship capability will be valuable.
Another interesting research question emerges
from our evaluation of the costs of pursuing a
CSRE strategy vis-à-vis a particular stakeholder
group when the firm’s overall ethical culture
promotes contradictory norms. One of the key
empirical questions that emerges is whether it is
possible for a firm with a firmly entrenched relational ethics strategy based on an agency or
corporate egoist culture to successfully adopt
a CSRE strategy and, thus, develop a close relationship capability with a stakeholder. We
would predict that a moral crisis of some magnitude would be required, and possibly a change in
leadership. Perhaps one strategy that could help
with such a transition would be to adopt a CSRE
strategy on a small scale first, with one or a few
stakeholders or in only one division of a larger
company. If the effort is successful, it could create
an impetus for changes with other stakeholders or
other parts of the firm.
Almost all of the IST research is based on the
(often unstated) assumption that an IST-based
strategy is good for all firms in all situations. Very
recently, scholars have begun to explore potential
moderating influences (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2014,
2016; Garcia-Castro & Francoeur, 2016). We extend
this work here, thus offering a theoretical foundation that other researchers can build on. Each of the
three contextual moderators represents a potential
research proposition that can be tested in future
research. The environmental moderators of dynamism, knowledge intensity, and interdependence
with stakeholders are especially important because
they are increasing in pervasiveness. Freeman argued in the early pages of his classic book (Strategic
Management: A Stakeholder Approach, 1984) that
a stakeholder approach to management is an effective way to deal with a tumultuous and complex
environment. That was over three decades ago, and
the business environment has become even more
turbulent and complex. It is possible, then, that
a stakeholder approach to management is actually
increasing in its importance and effectiveness owing to ongoing forces.
For practitioners, then, this article offers a
plausible argument for why their firms should
seriously consider adopting a CSRE strategy in
spite of its incremental costs, particularly if they
find themselves in a highly dynamic business
or one in which knowledge intensity is high,
or when they have a large, complicated, and
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interdependent production system. It helps to explain that if managers develop a close relationship capability, it is going to be rare and hard to
imitate and may therefore serve as a source of
sustainable competitive advantage.
The flip side of this conclusion is that it tells
managers the circumstances under which the
ethical treatment of stakeholders is very unlikely
to improve (and may harm) the firm’s financial
performance. This observation leads to a potential
ethical dilemma. Our theory explains why an
arm’s-length relationship may lead to higher financial performance in certain situations, as in
environments characterized by low dynamism,
low knowledge intensity, or low stakeholder interdependence. As scholars have convincingly
argued, it is not good for society if firms are oriented only toward profits (Harrison & Wicks, 2013;
Jones & Felps, 2013a; Stout, 2012). As Jones and
colleagues (2016) have explained, achieving social
welfare gains, in the context of firms attempting to
maximize the wealth of their shareholders, is quite
difficult. Consequently, in certain circumstances
there seems to be an underlying tension between
what might be good for a firm and what is most
beneficial for society as a whole. How individual
managers react to this dilemma depends on their
conscience and amount of discretion (Phillips,
Berman, Elms, & Johnson-Cramer, 2010).
In the introduction to the recent AMR Special
Topic Forum on Management Theory and Social
Welfare, Jones and colleagues (2016) also urged
management scholars to include an assessment
of the social welfare implications of their research
in their publications. They were particularly concerned about prescriptions that promise greater
profitability for firms without an assessment of
the welfare effects on stakeholders. They concluded that the only certain formula for improving
social welfare is through Pareto improvements—
that is, policies/decisions in which one (or more)
parties is made better off without making any
other party worse off. Our theory demonstrating
how a CSRE strategy can lead to sustainable
competitive advantage through development of
a close relationship capability may have the potential to meet this standard in many cases because the benefits of the firm/stakeholder joint
wealth creation effort are intended to be distributed fairly and the strategy does not require that
any other party be negatively affected. Indeed,
a firm-level ethical culture that would be most
supportive of a CSRE strategy would also
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discourage managers from making other parties
worse off.
Connecting with the RBV Literature
As outlined in the previous sections, our study
addresses a number of problems with currently
available versions of IST theory. However, since it
makes use of the resource-based perspective, it also
makes a contribution to the strategic competitiveness literature. In spite of the obvious link between
organizational ethics and a firm’s relationships with
its stakeholders, and the importance of stakeholder
relationships to a firm’s competitiveness, the critical
link between the nature of a firm’s ethics and competitive advantage has rarely been addressed (Litz,
1996). One noteworthy exception is Manroop, Singh,
and Ezzedeen (2014), who used the RBV to examine
how human resource systems influence the ability
of a firm’s ethical climate to create strategic value.
Of the three main research streams within RBV—
the classic RBV perspective, the knowledge-based
view, and the relational view (Acedo, Barroso, &
Galan, 2006; Dyer, 1997; Dyer & Singh, 1998)—our
study is most consistent with the relational view,
and while we did not employ the knowledgebased view per se, knowledge intensity is also an
important construct in our analysis. Our theory
builds on the increasingly popular idea in the RBV
literature that intangible resources (capabilities)
such as stakeholder relations, culture, and competencies, when utilized effectively, can be more
effective sources of sustainable competitive advantage than can tangible resources such as
products (Barney, 2011; Newbert, 2007).
Building on the Relational View of
Stakeholder Theory
Most of the IST literature focuses on the existence (or absence) of stakeholder-friendly
(or stakeholder-hostile) policies or programs
established by firms regarding treatment of
stakeholders.11 We depart from this pattern by
11
The majority of empirical tests of IST to date contain
variables similar to those found in the Kinder, Lydenberg &
Domini (KLD) database. Examples include whether the firm
has a profit sharing program, whether it has policies regarding
the way it treats particular groups, whether it has a strong
product safety program, or whether the firm is generous in
donating to charities. For a complete list, see MSCI ESG
Research (2011). A review of this literature can be found in
Freeman et al. (2010).
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contributing to a small but increasingly important
stream in this literature on bilateral interactions
between firms and stakeholders, an approach
advocated by Jones (2011). Our theory acknowledges that firm/stakeholder relationships are bidirectional, develop over time, and depend on the
relational orientations of the stakeholders themselves. For example, it accounts for the fact that
a stakeholder may not always behave in ways
predicted by extant IST theory (Bridoux &
Stoelhorst, 2014).
In addition to differences in their willingness
to reciprocate, stakeholders may be unwilling to
divulge the kind of information needed to achieve
sustainable competitive advantage (Harrison
et al., 2010), thus reducing benefits from knowledge transfer. Likewise, many stakeholders may
not be willing to adopt the other ethical norms,
such as a reliance on informal contracting or high
levels of voluntary cooperation. Consequently,
essential to the nature of a firm’s relationship with
stakeholders is its ability to attract high-quality
stakeholders that are willing to conform to the
norms of CSRE. In terms of future research, this
suggests that assessing stakeholder relationships
requires measuring the behaviors and attitudes of
both the firm and particular stakeholders, as well
as measuring how those relationships change
over time. We would expect such scholarship to
explain much more variance in economic performance (Larson, 1992).
Furthermore, adopting a relational perspective opens up a number of interesting questions
about relationships with stakeholders. For example, what types of norm violations cause
a close relationship capability to disappear
(or are some stakeholders comparatively forgiving), and how can close relationships be
repaired? How long does it take to develop
a close relationship capability leading to sustainable competitive advantage? How do CSRE
strategies evolve over time and in response to
different kinds of feedback? Also, to what extent
are CSRE strategies more likely, or more advantageous, in collectivist versus individualist
societies? And to what extent do Western ideals
regarding ethics influence perceptions of the
attractiveness, content, and efficacy of a CSRE
strategy and the resulting close relationship
capability?
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Limitations
Our analysis also comes with limitations. First,
and perhaps most important, for analysis purposes we divided our relational ethics strategies
into two very different models of stakeholder
management. Although there are firms that have
norms that are reflected by these idealized states,
we recognize that some firms will fall somewhere
in between on the close relationship/arm’s-length
transactions scale. But this raises the question
of at what point the benefits associated with
a close relationship capability manifest. Is the
relationship linear or are there threshold effects?
This actually represents an opportunity for researchers to explore what other relational ethics
strategies look like and how they might perform
under particular circumstances.
Another issue worth mentioning is our focus in
this article on dyadic relationships between firms
and stakeholder groups. Two observations are
warranted here. First, there is no reason that our
conclusions could not be extended to multiparty
relationships. For example, a firm, a key customer, and a supplier might team up to develop
a new or improved product. Second, we fully recognize that perceptions of a CSRE strategy, and
the intentions behind it, will be affected by the
kinds of strategies a firm pursues with regard to
other stakeholders. For instance, if a stakeholder
group knows a firm treats another group differently, it may see the firm as inauthentic, which
could undermine the ability of the firm to develop
a close relationship capability. Along these lines,
we suspect that a firm is more likely to be successful in developing a close relationship capability if firm members are consistent in their CSRE
strategy across stakeholders. Moreover, even
though a particular relationship may be dyadic, it
is influenced by norms and behaviors that are
typical in the broader firm community. We leave it
to future researchers to more carefully evaluate
these sorts of influences.
In addition, our analysis and theory may not
apply as well to cultures other than those found in
North America and particularly in the United
States. Many of these cultures—for example,
much of Asia—are much more collectivist. As
such, strategies resembling CSRE are less likely
to be rare and may be easier to imitate, making
any competitive advantage accruing to them less
valuable and sustainable. We leave questions
related to cultural differences to future research.
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We should add that it will take substantial effort
to measure the constructs discussed in this article. Going forward, empirical research to test the
relationships we have described would have to be
different from most of what currently exists in the
literature. Just as the theory contained herein
provides a more fine-grained perspective on IST,
the measures used in its testing will have to be
more precise.
Globally, databases containing a lot of information around the topics of corporate responsibility and sustainability are growing in number.
However, as mentioned earlier in the article,
the data in these databases are policy and outcome oriented and do not contain much information of use in describing the actual nature of
firm/stakeholder relationships. To measure CSRE
strategies, we would suggest surveying firm
leaders on whether their intention vis-à-vis
a particular stakeholder (group) is to develop
a communal sharing versus market pricing relationship. To measure whether firms actually
have a close relationship capability, we would
suggest asking stakeholders (e.g., customers,
employees, suppliers) whether their interactions
with the firm are governed by the norms of communal sharing and whether they feel a bond of
commitment to the firm (Bosse & Coughlan, 2016).
To accomplish this, we would suggest adapting
items from existing relational models scales
(Haslam & Fiske, 1999; Haslam, Reichert, & Fiske,
2002). For example, researchers might pose the
following sorts of items to stakeholders: “If a disagreement arose with [the firm], we would resolve
it by consensus”; “I share similar values to those
expressed by [the firm]”; and “In interacting with
[the firm], the focus is on mutually beneficial outcomes.” Examination of relational data based on
extraction of news stories is another possibility
(Henisz et al., 2014). Finally, the sort of relational
theory of competitive advantage that we advance
could be meaningfully specified and elaborated
on by careful ethnographic work (e.g., Larson,
1992; Uzzi, 1997). Such work, while often fascinating, is also quite time intensive and raises questions of generalizability.
With regard to dependent variables, the ultimate dependent variable in IST research tends to
be firm financial performance—as operationalized by measures such as shareholder returns,
returns on assets, and returns to debt holders.
However, to fully capture the elements of the
theory, it would be necessary also to somehow
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reflect the total value created from a close relationship capability. Total value will not be
entirely captured by financial measures, especially because firms that pursue such a strategy
may voluntarily distribute comparatively more
value back to the stakeholders that helped to
create it. To capture total value creation, it would
seem necessary to use broader constructs such
as stakeholder utility or happiness enhancement
(Harrison & Wicks, 2013; Jones & Felps, 2013b), as
well as analytic methods such as data envelopment analysis (DEA) that can combine disparate
kinds of goods (Bendheim, Waddock, & Graves,
1998). Of course, case study methodologies can
also provide opportunities to refine both the
theory contained in this article and techniques
to measure both the nature of firm/stakeholder
relationships and value-based performance
measures.
CONCLUSION
This article integrates prior work on relational
models (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2016; Fiske, 1992),
stakeholder culture (Jones et al., 2007), and arm’slength versus embedded relationships (Uzzi, 1997)
with work on IST (Harrison et al., 2010; Jones, 1995;
Tantalo & Priem, 2016) and the RBV (Barney, 1991).
While a substantial body of prior scholarship
suggests that close relationships have value
(e.g., Bosse & Coughlan, 2016; Cooper & Gardner,
1993; Larson, 1992; Uzzi, 1997), we are not aware of
any other scholarship that provides a detailed
examination of why the capability to create
a close relationship with a stakeholder could
represent a source of sustainable competitive
advantage. We have provided a model that illustrates that, given particular contextual and firmspecific conditions, the incremental benefits of
a close relationship capability can exceed the
costs of a strategy used to develop and maintain
it. Furthermore, firms that are successful in developing a close relationship capability may
enjoy a sustainable competitive advantage because such capabilities are likely to be rare and
are very difficult to imitate, even in contexts in
which they are the most advantageous.
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